编者按：2月22日上午，由中国公共外交协会、北京大学和中国人民大学联合主办的“对话合作，管控分歧——推动中美关系重回正轨”蓝厅论坛成功举办。国务委员兼外交部长王毅出席论坛开幕式并致辞。美国前财政部长亨利·保尔森，美国亚洲协会会长、澳大利亚前总理陆克文，北京大学校长郝平，美国史带金融财团董事长兼ceo莫里斯·格林伯格，中国驻美国大使崔天凯先后在开幕式致辞。
论坛设置了三场平行分论坛，分别围绕“重塑政治互信”“重建经贸均衡”“重启人文交流”展开研讨。
中国人民大学重阳金融研究院是本次论坛的主要承办方之一，承接大量会务与中外嘉宾邀请事务，并主持分论坛二。论坛以网络视频连线形式召开。政商、教育、文化、体育等40多位中外代表参加。这是拜登执政以来中国机构主办的第一场大型中美对话。美国亚洲协会会长、澳大利亚前总理陆克文（kevin rudd）以“有管控的战略竞争”为题在开幕式上致辞，以下为发言实录。
美国亚洲协会会长、澳大利亚前总理陆克文（kevin rudd）
尊敬的王毅国务委员、外长先生，
保尔森先生，郝校长，格林伯格先生，崔大使，
各位同事朋友们，大家好！
今天是正月十一，给大家拜个晚年，祝大家牛年大吉！谢谢主办方邀请我来讲几句话。这次蓝厅论坛的主题是“对话合作，管控分歧”。我相信今天来的各位，也都支持中美关系回正轨。
未来十年，中美战略竞争，应该不可避免。但是中美战争，可以努力避免。
竞争，来自《庄子》。意思是：并逐为竞，对辩为争。我的理解：在规则中，更优者胜。所以我提出“有管控的战略竞争”。竞争可以，但要有底线，要有规则。核心目标是：管控竞争，避免战争。
王毅国务委员在美国亚洲协会最近的一次视频交流中表示，中美关系正面临“建交以来最严重的挑战”。我认为，这是一个正确的评价。所有的一切都表明，21世纪20年代将是中美关系，以及中美与世界其他国家关系成败的十年。
未来这几年，正如习主席在2017年所说的那样，中国的目标是“走近世界舞台的中央”，并作为一个大国承担起更大的全球领导力。这几年，按市场汇率计算，中国是世界上最有可能超越美国成为世界最大经济体，并将寻求在技术创新方面取得领先地位。同样，在未来这几年里，通过参与如拜登总统最近所描述的“极端竞争”，美国在拜登政府的执政下，将寻求维持在经济、科技、军事等所有关键领域的领先地位。
因此，受到无情的修昔底德逻辑的驱使，中美两国间的竞争将在21世纪20年代进入一个决定性阶段。这对我们所有人来说，将进入一个危险生活的时期。
无论双方采取何种策略，无论事如何发展，中美之间的进展关系将日益加剧，竞争将愈演愈烈，这些均不可避免。然而，战争并非不可避免。
目前来看，两国仍然有可能建立一个防止灾难发生的防护系统，一个我称之为“有管控的战略竞争”的联合框架，使得华盛顿和北京能够进行高水平的战略竞争，同时减少这种竞争升级为公开冲突的风险。对于这个提法感兴趣的朋友，可以看最新一期美国《外交》杂志上的我的相关文章。
“有管控的战略竞争”理念是基于对全球秩序的深刻现实主义观点。它接受国家将通过建立对自己有利的力量平衡来寻求安全，同时也认识到，在这样做的过程中会给其他国家造成安全困境，而这些国家的根本利益可能会因为他们的行动而受到损害。在这种情况下，诀窍是通过共同制定有限的有助于防止冲突的道路规则来降低双方在竞争展开时的风险。在这个论点上，中美两国需要从古巴导弹危机后美国和苏联建立的治理两国关系的程序和机制中吸取教训，但就中美关系而言，不需要先经历一场勉强避免战争的濒死经历。
“有管控的战略竞争”包含了三个关键支柱：
第一，美国和中国需要共同对两国的安全政策和行为(以及其盟友的安全政策和行为)设定某些硬性限制，以控制竞争升级为对生存问题的冲突。例如，中美联合公报中所阐述的“一个中国”政策就至关重要。结束特朗普政府不必要的挑衅行动将很重要。就北京而言，它应该缩减自己最近在台湾海峡和台湾周边地区的军事演习、部署等。
第二，如果中美双方能够就这一系列约定达成一致，那么两个国家均应接受对方将仍然试图最大限度地发挥自己的优势，但又不突破双方关系的战略限制。华盛顿和北京可以在世界各个区域，为提高战略和经济影响力，采取双边或多边的方式，而继续相互竞争。这是新的现实。双方会继续寻求对等的市场准入，并在这种准入被拒绝时仍将采取报复性措施。双方仍会在外国投资市场、技术市场、资本市场，以及货币市场上进行竞争。双方很可能会在全球范围内开展一场争夺人心的竞赛，目标在于向世界展示他们的发展和管理系统是最好的。
正如王毅国务委员之前所说，中国对人权和民主的定义，与美国、亚洲和欧洲其他自由民主国家的定义不同，这就是现实。所以，让这两种世界观在这个关键问题上进行竞争吧，但这种竞争将是有限度的。
第三，即使在竞争升级的情况下，两国也必须在一些确定的领域找到继续就重大全球挑战进行战略合作的空间。这一点即便是在美苏冷战时期也出现过。现在，当眼前的军事风险可能没有那么高，但全球挑战却越来越紧迫的时候，美国和中国之间肯定应该可以做到这一点。气候变化、抗击疫情和改善公共卫生、全球经济复苏、绿色复苏和金融稳定、包括限制ai战争在内的核武器控制，这些都是亟需合作的领域。这不仅是为了世界的利益，也符合中美两国的国家利益。
之前王毅国务委员也提出过类似的建议，即“三份清单”。我认为，当务之急，双方都应该分析这个“有管控的战略竞争”的概念。另一种选择是无管控的战略竞争，以及现在所带来的各种风险。可能会有许多人会批评这种做法很幼稚，其他人或许会说它太局限。但是，他们的责任则是要提出更好的方式。
我非常欢迎王毅国务委员今天就中美潜在战略合作的三个领域发表看法。我们在美国和世界其他地方也注意到，中国政府任命解振华作为中国气候特使这一积极举措，解振华是世界许多人的朋友，他和美国前国务卿克里将有很多重要的事情要做，我们也希望他们能够做成这些重要的事。
目前，美国和中国都在寻找管理未来十年危险关系的方案。残酷的事实是，除非双方就管控的条件达成基本协议，否则任何关系都不可能得到成功管控。
尽管有管控的战略竞争框架很难构建，但是这样做仍然是可能的，而不这样做，即没有护栏、规则和管控，则可能是灾难性的。
如同亨利·基辛格博士在冷战时期曾经说过的一句话：“我们知道我们必须做什么，我们也知道我们能做什么，剩下的就只是去做了。”
谢谢！
（翻译：杨清清、刘思悦）
以下为发言英文版
2021 mfa lanting forum on “managed strategic competition”
the hon. kevin rudd ac
26th prime minister of australia
president and ceo of asia society
president of asia society policy institute
22 february 2021
尊敬的王毅国务委员、外长先生，
保尔森先生，郝校长，格林伯格先生，崔大使，
各位同事朋友们，大家好！
今天是正月十一，给大家拜个晚年，祝大家牛年大吉！谢谢主办方邀请我来讲几句话。这次蓝厅论坛的主题是“对话合作，管控分歧”。我相信今天来的各位，也都支持中美关系回正轨。
未来十年，中美战略竞争，应该不可避免。但是中美战争，可以努力避免。
竞争，来自《庄子》。意思是：并逐为竞，对辩为争。我的理解：在规则中，更优者胜。所以我提出“有管控的战略竞争”。竞争可以，但要有底线，要有规则。核心目标是：管控竞争，避免战争。
具体来讲，我用英文。
state councilor wang has said during a recent event at asia society, that the us-china relationship is facing “the most serious challenges since the establishment of diplomatic relations”. i believe that is a correct assessment.
everything points to the years ahead over the 2020s as being a make or break decade for the china and u.s. relations, and for their relationship with other countries around the world.
these are the years in which china aims to “move closer to center stage” in the world, as president xi put it in 2017, and take up greater global leadership as a major power. these are the years in which china is most likely to pass the united states as the world’s largest economy by market exchange rates, and will seek to achieve a leading role in technological innovation. these are also the years in which the united states, under the biden administration, will seek to retain its leading position across all crucial domains - economic, technological, military, etc. - by
engaging in what president biden recently described as “extreme competition”.
the contest between the two countries will therefore enter a decisive phase in the 2020s, driven by inexorable thucydidean logic. this will be the decade of living dangerously for us all.
no matter what stratagems the two sides pursue or what events unfold, the tension between the united states and china will grow, and competition will intensify; it is probably inevitable.
war, however, is not inevitable.
it remains possible for the two countries to put in place a system of guardrails that would prevent a catastrophe: a joint framework for what i call “managed strategic competition” that would allow washington and beijing to conduct a high level of strategic competition while reducing the risk of that competition escalating into open conflict.
for those colleagues who are interested in, this is what i published recently edition on foreign affairs magazine in united states.
the idea of managed strategic competition is anchored in a deeply realist view (现实主义) of the global order. it accepts that states will continue to seek security by building a balance of power in their favor, while recognizing that in doing so they are likely to create security dilemmas for other states whose fundamental interests may be disadvantaged by their actions.
the trick in this case is to reduce the risk to both sides as the competition between them unfolds by jointly crafting a limited number of rules of the road that will help prevent conflict. in this argue, the two countries need to draw lessons from the procedures and mechanisms that the united states and the soviet union put in place to govern their relations after the cuban missile crisis-but in the case of china and u.s. relations, without first going through the near-death experience of a barely avoided war.
managed strategic competition would involve three key pillars:
first, the us and china would need to jointly establish certain hard limits on each country’s security policies and conduct (and that of their allies) in order to manage the escalation of competition into conflict over existential issues.
for example, the “one china” policy as articulated in the joint communiques between us and china, is critical. ending the trump administration’s unnecessarily provocative actions will be important. for its part, beijing should dial back the recent pattern of its own military exercises, deployments, and maneuvers in the taiwan strait and around taiwan.
second, if both sides could agree on a series of such stipulations, each would then have to accept that the other will still try to maximize its advantages while stopping short of breaching the strategic limits of the relationship. washington and beijing would continue their competition for strategic and economic influence - bilaterally, multilaterally and across the various regions of the world. this is the new reality.
they would keep seeking reciprocal access to each other’s markets and would still take retaliatory measures when such access was denied. they would still compete in foreign investment markets, technology markets, capital markets, and currency markets. and they would likely carry out a global contest for hearts and minds, each aiming to demonstrate that their system of development and governance is the best available.
as state councilor wang yi said before, china has a different definition of human rights and democracy to those of the united states and to those of other liberal democracies in asia and europe. that’s the reality. so let there be a competition between these two worldviews on this critical question. but such a competition would be bounded.
finally, even amid escalating competition, the two countries will have to find room for continued strategic cooperation on critical global challenges in a number of defined areas. this occurred even between the united states and the soviet union at the height of the cold war. it should certainly be possible now between the united states and china, when the immediate military stakes may not be nearly as high, but where global challenges are increasingly pressing.
climate change, combatting the pandemic and improving public health, global economic recovery, green recovery and financial stability, and nuclear arms control including limitations on ai warfare are examples of where cooperation will be necessary, not just for the world’s interests, but to secure china’s and america’s national interests as well.
state councillor wang in the past has proposed something similar, “the three lists”. i believe that the time is right for a concept of managed strategic competition to be analysed by both sides as a matter of urgency. the alternative is unmanaged strategic competition with all the risks that now entails.
there will be many who will criticize this approach as naive. others will say it is too limited. their responsibility, however, is then to come up with something better.
i also welcome what state councilor wang yi has to say today about the three areas of potentially strategic cooperation between the u.s. and china. we’ve also carefully noticed in the u.s. and around the world about the positive decision by the chinese government to appoint xie zhenhua, a friend of many of us in the world, as china’s special envoy on climate. xie zhenhua and former secretary of the state kerry have a lot of work to do. and we wish them will.
both the united states and china are currently in search of a formula to manage their relationship for the dangerous decade ahead. the hard truth is that no relationship can ever be managed unless there is a basic agreement between the parties on the terms of that management.
although a framework of managed strategic competition would be difficult to construct, doing so is still possible - and the alternative, that is , no guardrails, no rules and no management, is potentially catastrophic.
as dr. henry kissinger once said during the cold war: “we know what we must do. we also know what we can do. it only remains to do it.”
thank you very much.
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