演讲者陆克文系澳大利亚第26任总理、亚洲协会主席兼ceo、亚洲协会政策研究院主席，本文发于9月2日世界和平论坛微信公众号。
维护世界和平
管控中美战略竞争
7月3日
第九届世界和平论坛主旨演讲
陆克文阁下
第二十六任澳大利亚总理
美国亚洲协会会长兼ceo
thank you president wang chao for your kind introduction. it's good to be back at the world peace forum, and to say a few words here with friends and colleagues.
感谢王超会长，谢谢您对我的热情介绍。很高兴可以再次出席世界和平论坛，在这里我想对我的同事和朋友们说上几句。
what state councilor wang yi just said provides much to reflect on.
王毅国务委员方才的发言十分发人深思。
the theme of this plenary session is “reassessing the international order”.
我们这一节的议题是国际秩序变化的新趋势。
today, there is an elephant in the room that needs to be addressed when it comes to our changing international order and the preservation of peace in the world. that is the u.s.-china relationship.
今天，当我们要讨论国际秩序变化以及维护世界和平时，房间里总有一头不能不被论及的“大象”。那就是中美关系。
i have spoken in the past of how we are all now entering a “decade of living dangerously.”
我在以往的讨论中也提到过，我们正在步入一个“危险的十年”。
fundamentally, that is because the u.s-china relationship is now strategically adrift. after nearly four decades in which that relationship was characterized by strategic engagement, an undisciplined “strategic competition” has now become the norm.
本质上，这是由于中美关系出现了战略性变化。在过去的四十年里，中美关系被定义为战略接触，现在这个关系成为了无节制的“战略竞争”。并且，这已经成为了常态。
moreover, both countries in my view believe that this decade will be make-or-break for their status as the future leading global power. and they fear that this could be a zero-sum moment.
而且，在我看来，两国都将最近的十年视作争夺未来国际领导地位的胜负关键。同时，它们又很担心这会是零和博弈。
no new strategic framework between the two countries has yet been established to guide their relationship through this time of trouble.
但是，就目前状况而言，还未能找到一个新的战略框架以缓解两国的紧张关系。
therefore, no matter what tactics or stratagems the two sides pursue or what events unfold, the tension between the united states and china will grow, and competition will intensify; that is inevitable.
因此，不管两边采取何种策略，不管两国关系如何发展，中美之间的紧张关系仍将持续下去，竞争也会愈发激烈，这是不可避免的。
however, as i have written before, waris not.
但是，就像我以前说过的，战争不是。
the deeply conflicting nature of u.s. and chinese strategic objectives and the profoundly competitive nature of the relationship may make conflict, and even war, seem inevitable-even if neither country wants that outcome.
两国的战略目标存在根本差异，同时两国关系的本质是竞争关系，这些因素可能会使得两国产生冲突，甚至战争。即便双方都不愿看到如此场景，但这看起来似乎是不可避免的。
indeed it is important to consider once again the argument of harvard scholar graham allison's “thucydides' trap” thesis–that rising and established powers are destined to engage in dangerous rivalry, and even conflict.
确实有必要再次思考哈佛学者格雷厄姆·艾利森提出的“修昔底德陷阱”，即新兴大国和守成大国之间必然陷入危险的相互对立，甚至冲突关系。
but it is easy to predict war. it is much harder to outline a course that could help both countries safeguard the peace. in my view, there is nothing inevitable about war. to believe that denies the agency of leadership and makes us all captive to some deep, irreversible trends of history.
断言战争的发生是很容易的，而提出一种方案帮助两国维持和平却是难上加难。在我看来，战争不是必然。“战争必然到来”的论调实际上否认了领导力的能动作用，从而掉入一种看似深刻的历史宿命。
as president xi jinping has said, we “must not create such traps for ourselves.” war under such circumstances may be a growing danger, but it is by no means inevitable. history should always be our guide, but never our master.
中国领导人曾说过，我们不能自己给自己造成“修昔底德陷阱”。权力转移期间战争的风险会不断增加，但绝对不是不可避免的。我们应该以史为鉴，但不能被历史操控和左右。
speaking as someone who is neither from the u.s. nor from china, but has lived in and studied both deeply, and has a great respect and fondness for both countries' people, history, and culture, i can certainly say that the world at large has no desire to see them come to war-whether hot or cold.
我既不是美国人也不是中国人，但是我在两国都生活过，而且对两国进行过深入研究。对于两国的人民、历史和文化，我都有着深深的敬意和热爱。我相信世界不希望两国开战，无论是热战还是冷战。
certainly, the rest of the world, and not just asia, would welcome a future where they are not forced to make the ultimate binary choice between beijing and washington in what they fear is becoming an increasingly bipolar world.
当然，世界其它国家，不仅仅是亚洲国家，都害怕世界越来越两极化，都希望不会被迫在北京和华盛顿之间选边站。
they would instead prefer a world in which there continues to be a global order in which each country, large and small, can have confidence in its future territorial integrity, political sovereignty and its own pathway to national prosperity–as well as an international system with the capacity to act on the great global challenges of our time, like climate change, which no individual nation can solve alone.
大家更希望世界维持这样的一种秩序——每个国家，无论大小，都对维护其领土完整和政治主权以及选择自身发展道路有信心。大家也更希望，国际体系有能力应对我们这个时代的重大全球挑战，例如气候变化，这是任何一个国家都无法单独解决的问题。
there is therefore no other realistic alternative: a new strategic framework to manage u.s.-china relations must be found.
因此，从现实来看，我们别无选择：我们必须找到一个管控中美关系的新战略框架。
i also have a deeply realist view of the difficulties that now lie ahead in forging a common strategic future between them. whatever strategic trust that may have once existed in the relationship is now gone. and the reasons for this are not personal, whimsical nor ephemeral. they are structural.
当然，我很现实地明白要让中美两国找到一个共同的战略未来，这很有难度。两国曾经建立的战略信任的基础已不复存在。造成这样并非因为个人，也不是因为一些离奇或者短期因素，而是因为一些结构性因素。
and i am not so naive as to believe that any agreed strategic framework will prevent china and the u.s. from strategizing against the other and deploying their statecraft and assets as best they can in the hope of either maintaining or securing long-termprimacy.
我不会天真以为中美之间共同认可的战略框架可以阻止双方视对方为战略对手，并阻止双方为了维持或确保长期优先地位而倾尽它们的软硬实力。
but if the united states and the soviet union, following the near-death experience of the cuban missile crisis, could eventually agree on a political and strategic framework to manage their own fraught relationship without triggering mutual annihilation, surely it's possible to do the same between america and china in the infinitely less trying geopolitical circumstances of today.
但是，如果美国和苏联最终都能在濒临毁灭的古巴导弹危机之后，建立起政治和战略框架来管控双方紧张关系从而避免触发相互毁灭，今天中美地缘战略竞争要缓和得多，双方更可以建立这样的管理框架。
this is where the idea of “managed strategic competition” emerges.
“可管控的战略竞争”这一概念就是基于以上事实提出的。
i have described “managed strategic competition” elsewhere in the past, and i know that many of you will already be familiar with it. but, in review, the idea is a relatively simple one in concept: to establish a new minimum strategic framework for u.s.-china relations based on three core propositions.
我曾经解释过“可管控的战略竞争”这一概念，可能不少人已有耳闻。这一概念不难理解：就是在中美之间建立一个基于对三个核心建议的最低战略框架。
first, to establish a clear understanding of each other's irreducible strategic redlines. this, to help prevent conflict through miscalculation or design by creating an environment in which each side concludes that clear strategic predictability advantages both, that strategic deception is futile, and that strategic surprise is just plain dangerous.
第一，明确了解对方不能触碰的战略红线在哪里。这种理解可以构建这样一种情境，即双方都认同战略可预测性有利于彼此，战略欺骗是徒劳无益的，以及战略意外是非常危险的，由此防止双方由于误判或有意算计所导致的冲突。
second, to then relocate the primary burden of strategic rivalry to a competitive race, in which each country would strive to its utmost for superiority, but would remain at peace. such strategic competition would also prioritize each side's political, economic, and ideological appeal to the rest of the world.
第二，转变战略对立为战略竞争，在竞争中，双方虽竭力争先，但也和平相处。在这样的战略竞争中，双方优先竞争对世界其他国家的政治、经济和意识形态吸引力。
and third, to create the political space necessary for china and the united states to continue to engage in strategic cooperation in a number of defined areas where each side agrees that both their global interests and their national interests would be enhanced by global collaboration–and indeed undermined by the absence of an agreed, collaborative approach, such as on climate change.
第三，创造必要的政治空间，使中美能够在一定领域进行战略合作。双方都认为在这些议题中，国际合作可以增进国家利益和全球利益，而缺乏合作则会无可置疑地损害各自利益，例如应对气候变化。
the idea of managed strategic competition is anchored in a deeply realist view of the global order. it accepts that states will continue to seek security by building a balance of power in their favor, while recognizing that in doing so they are likely to create security dilemmas for other states whose fundamental interests may be disadvantaged by these actions.
“可管控的战略竞争”理念深深根植于关于全球秩序的一个现实主义观点：各国将通过建立有利于它们自己的权力平衡来寻求国家的安全，同时它们也意识到这样做很可能会损害其它国家利益并使其陷入安全困境。
it is important to be realistic, of course, about what can be achieved through any such joint strategic framework. it will not itself prevent war. but, properly constructed, and based on clarity, transparency, and credible deterrence, it may reduce the risk of it.
对该战略框架能够实现何种战略目标有着清醒认识极为重要。这个框架本身并不能防止战争，但是如果能恰当地建构并借助于清晰、透明和可信威慑，可以降低战争风险。
the challenge in this case is to reduce the risk to both sides as the competition between them unfolds by jointly crafting a limited number of rules of the road that will help prevent war. the rules will still enable each side to compete vigorously across all policy and regional domains.
挑战是，共同构建有限的共同规则来预防战争从而既能够减少双方在展开竞争时面临的风险，也能够使双方在政策、区域所有维度进行充分竞争。
if both sides could agree on those stipulations, each would have to accept that the other will still try to maximize its advantages while stopping short of breaching the limits-or the commonly agreed strategic guard rails of the relationship.
如果双方能够就这些规则达成一致，则彼此需接受对方仍会在不突破极限或者双方商定的双边关系战略护栏的情况下最大化自身优势。
washington and beijing would continue to compete for strategic and economic influence across the various regions of the world. they would keep seeking reciprocal access to each other's markets and would still take retaliatory measures when such access is denied. they would still compete in foreign investment markets, technology markets, capital markets, and currency markets.
华盛顿与北京可以继续在世界各地区竞争战略和经济影响力。它们将继续寻求互惠，进入彼此的市场，并且也会在出现市场准入问题时互相制裁。它们会继续在第三国的投资市场、技术市场、资本市场和货币市场中展开竞争。
and they would likely carry out a global contest for hearts and minds, with washington stressing the importance of democracy, open economies, and human rights and beijing highlighting its approach known as “the china development model.”
他们会在全球进行思想竞争和人心争夺。华盛顿强调民主、开放经济和人权的重要性，而北京则强调自身的“中国模式”。
meanwhile the great strength of “managed strategic competition” as an agreed framework is that it also accommodates continued international collaboration between the two countries when it is in their national interests to do so.
而且这种“可管控的战略竞争”作为双边框架的优势在于，在符合双方国家利益的前提下可以继续进行国际事务上的合作
this would not be possible if we were already in the depths of a new cold war. in fact, a bilateral framework which continues to actively embrace defined areas of cooperation may well be the best means of arresting, or perhaps preventing, the full and formal slide into a cold war.
但是，如果我们已经深深陷入一场新冷战，国际合作就不再可能。事实上，这个双边框架能使双方在特定领域继续进行合作，这可能会是预防或阻止双边关系滑向冷战的最佳手段。
there are many, however, who would criticize such an approach as naïve. why, they ask, should their country tie its hands by accepting any limits in such an important contest?
有人会批评这样的想法太过天真。他们会问，为什么有国家会愿意在这么重要的一场竞赛中束手束脚呢？
many in beijing might question, for example, why china should in any way tie its hands in its approach to questions of territorial integrity and national sovereignty inplaces like the south china sea or east china sea – or for that matter in cyberspace or outer space.
很多中国人也会质疑，为什么中国在处理南海和东海等领土完整和国家主权问题或者网络空间或外太空等问题时，要选择束缚住自己的手脚呢？
meanwhile american military strategists, like their chinese counterparts, would not want their hands unnecessarily tied by what they would see as foreign policy abstractions that would get in the way of the hard business of military preparedness, naval exercises, and war plans.
同时，美国军事战略家和他们的中国同行一样，不想被外交政策的条条框框束缚住自己的手脚，因为这妨碍了他们进行军事筹备、海军军事演习和制定战争计划等艰巨任务。
and the pentagonor politicians on capitol hill could well argue that managed strategic competition would allow china to continue strengthening its economy and technological capabilities in the absence of any imminent threat, enabling china to continue expanding its military capabilities over the same period and placing it in an even more advantageous position by the end of the decade.
而且，五角大楼和国会山的政客会说，可管控的战略竞争可以使中国在没有紧迫威胁的情况下继续加强它的经济和技术能力，并使它能够在这一时期增强其军事能力，从而在十年后处于更有利的位置上。
but there are deeply realist answers to these objections.
对于这些反对意见，我有非常实际的回答。
from an american perspective, having another decade to rebuild, or in some cases deepen, us economic, military, and technological power, with some prospect of improving the balance of power in relation to china in each of these domains, is no small thing.
从美国的角度来看，花费十年的时间来进行重建，恢复或强化其经济、军事和技术上的优势，并有可能在各个领域改善相对中国的力量对比，这并不是一件小事。
in this sense, time could be argued to be america's friend, not its enemy, despite the fact that the chinese might of course argue the same from their own perspective as they too seek to enhance their strategic, military and economic position in the immediate years ahead.
从这一点上说，时间站在美国一边而非相反，虽然中国也会认为时间在他们一边，因为他们同样可以利用接下来的几年加强战略、军事和经济地位。
from both perspectives, the critical question would become one of whether you believed you would be in a better position to deter a military challenge based on your current military capabilities – or one based on the enhanced capabilities you would have in a decade's time. furthermore, if deterrence then failed, whether you would prefer to fight with your existing war-fighting capacity, or wait for an expanded capacity in the future.
从双方来看，一个关键的问题是，你认为自己是以现有的军事实力还是以十年后增强了的军事实力能更好地威慑对方的军事挑战？此外，如果威慑战略失败，你是否愿意用现有的作战能力直接进行战斗，还是等待未来增强能力后再投入战斗？
the truth, as both sides know, is that the uncertainty of the outcome of any conflict is too great. the sheer potential destructive force of such a conflagration is beyond imagining.
双方都知道，事实是，像这样的冲突，结果的不确定性太大了。这种冲突所带来的潜在且巨大破坏力是超出我们想象的。
and while some uber-hawks in both capitals may contemplate seeking to resolve the underlying political confrontation in the u.s-china relationship through a more immediate “limited war” as a demonstration of strength and resolve, this a fool's errand.
两个国家的鹰派人士可能会考虑通过更直接的“有限战争”来解决中美关系中的根本政治对抗，从而展示实力和决心。但这是一个很愚蠢的行为。
history tends not to believe in limited wars. history tells us instead that wars are far more likely to escalate uncontrollably. indeed, this thinking was part of the national psychologies at play prior to the outbreak of world war i.
历史告诫我们，不要相信所谓的“有限战争”。相反，历史证明了战争往往更可能不可控地升级。事实上，第一次世界大战爆发前各国国民就有通过有限战争展示实力决心的想法。
meanwhile, the bottom line is that a mutually agreed framework of “managed strategic competition” offers some potential to reduce the temperature levels in the most highly volatile theatres of operation – where at present there are very few, if any, rules of the road to prevent even unintentional crises and escalation.
同时，如果双方可以达成一种“可管控的战略竞争”的框架，那么至少就有可能降低在最不稳定竞争领域的竞争热度。目前，在这些领域，几乎没有什么防止意外危机和危机升级的规则。
absent any such “guardrails” for the future, the frequency and intensity of naval and airoperations mean that it is less and less a question of if beijing and washington will have to handle the operational consequences of an unintended collision between chinese, american or other military vessels or aircraft in the future, but when.
但是如果未来没有这样相关的“护栏”，基于双方海空军行动的频度和烈度，北京和华盛顿将不得不去应对中美因与对方或其他国家军舰发生意外碰撞而导致的后果，这越来越无疑问，有问题的只是时间。
for these reasons alone, there is an overwhelming case to take all necessary precautionary measures now to significantly reduce the risk of war. and that is where “managed strategic competition” comes in.
出于上述考虑，现在就必须采取必要且谨慎的措施去显著减少战争爆发的风险。正是在这方面，“可管控的战略竞争”可以起作用。
in the united states' case the principal benefit from an extended period of “managed strategic competition” would lie in the economic dimensions of its relationship with china.
对于美国来说，长期“可管控的战略竞争”带来的主要好处在于其与中国的经济关系。
the engine of america's global power remains its economy – its size, its innovation, its efficiency, its competitiveness, its influence on international standard-setting, its impact on global trade and investment, the depth of its capital markets, and the continuing global status of the us dollar. none of these historical economic strengths are set in concrete. all are now being challenged. all need to be addressed with reform.
美国的全球领导力仍然发轫于它的经济——其规模、创新、效率和竞争力，以及对国际标准制定的影响，对全球贸易和投资的影响，以及自身资本市场的深度和美元持续的全球主导地位。这些美国历史性经济实力并非一成不变。如今，美国在各方面的地位皆被挑战，因此需要通过改革来应对。
an ability to contain the underlying security “red lines” in the relationship within reasonable, manageable, and stable strategic guard rails would enable the u.s.to focus on the long-term fundamentals of american national power.
将两国关系中根本的安全“红线”控制在合理、可控和稳定的战略护栏内，将使美国能够关注其国力的长期基本面。
the reality is that america needs time to do this. indeed, for america to succeed with an effective national strategy, it will also need sufficient buy-in across both sides of american politics so that the 2020s becomes a decade of rebuilding american power, no matter which party holds political power.
事实上，美国需要时间来做到这一点。美国要想通过有效的国家战略来取得成功，无论哪一个政党掌权，都需两党的鼎力支持。如此才可在21世纪20年代这十年重建美国实力。
this will require unprecedented bipartisan consensus to guarantee strategic continuity across administrations, rather than one that is truncated every time there is a change in the white house. this will not be easy.
这将需要两党达成前所未有的共识来确保不同政府间的战略连续性，而不是每次白宫一换主人原先战略就被生生截断。要想做到这样并非是一件容易的事情。
for china, the situation is also similar.
对于中国来说，情况也类似。
we should never forget that china's underlying interests continue to lie in the long-term growth of its economy. it is the size, sophistication and strength of the chinese economy that remains fundamental to all other elements of chinese national power.
我们永远不应忘记，中国的根本利益依旧在于其经济的长期增长。相较于中国国家实力的其它要素，其经济的规模、成熟度以及经济实力仍然是最为根本的。
for nearly 20 years, successive chinese leaders defined the current era as a “period of strategic opportunity” when the absence of significant international conflict meant that china could focus almost exclusively on its national economic development task, allowing it to fulfill the first centenary goal of achieving a moderately prosperous society.
近二十年来，历任中国领导人都把当前这个时期定义为“战略机遇期”。在没有重大的国际冲突情况下，中国可以聚精会神谋经济发展，实现了全面建成小康社会的第一个百年目标。
but that era of easy opportunity is over. as president xi said in his recent speech, china has entered a new era in which the challenges arising from both “the change to the principal contradiction in chinese society and the new issues and challenges stemming from a complicated international environment” now necessitate a “new development philosophy” and a “new pattern of development,” as well as national“self-reliance” in technology.
但是，这个轻易可得的机遇期已经结束了。就如中国领导人近期演讲中所提及的那样，中国已经进入了一个新时代，既要面对“社会主要矛盾变化带来的新特征新要求”，又要面对“错综复杂的国际环境带来的新矛盾新挑战”，必须树立“新发展理念”，探索“新发展方式”，实现国家在技术上的“自力更生”。
the reality is that china now finds itself in a more adversarial strategic environment than before.
事实上，中国现在发现自身处于比原先更具敌意的战略环境中。
on balance, the chinese political establishment would of course have preferred to have avoided the new, sharp edges of america's post-2017 strategic approach to china.
总的来说，中国的政治建制派更希望能够避免2017年以来美国出台的强硬的对华战略。
there are several economic drivers underpinning china's position: china has still not passed the united states in aggregate economic size; china has not yet escaped the middle-income trap, despite such significant progress on eliminating poverty;
支撑中国地位的经济驱动因素有如下两个：中国的总体经济规模还未超越美国；尽管中国在消除贫困方面取得了巨大进步，但它并未完全越过中等收入的陷阱。
china remains critically dependent on the us for various critical technology imports like semi-conductors; china is also chronically reliant on a number of american allies for its long-termmineral and energy needs; and china will still be vulnerable to the current u.s. dollar-denominated and dominated international financial system for a large part of the decade ahead.
中国在半导体等关键技术领域，仍然十分依赖美国；中国还依赖美国的一些盟友来满足其长期的矿产和能源需求；在未来十年的大部分时间里，中国仍将受到当前以美元计价和主导的国际金融体系的影响。
indeed, it maybe the view of some chinese strategic analysts, that the recent and rapid deterioration in u.s.-china relations, and the associated crises in china's relations with various u.s. allies and partners, have come a decade too early.
一些中国战略分析人士可能认为，中美关系近来的快速恶化，以及相伴而来的中国与美国的盟友和伙伴之间的危机，来得早了十年。
therefore, there are reasons that china may wish to see some level of re-stabilization of the u.s.-china relationship that would enable the chinese leadership to return to its principle focus on the economy.
因此，中国有理由希望看到中美关系在一定程度上趋于稳定，这将使中国领导层能再次将主要精力放在经济方面。
china is sufficiently pragmatic to recognize that returning the relationship to the status quo ante is simply not possible. too much has happened since the 2018-19 trade war, the 2020 pandemic and the increasingly hard-wired policy settings of the biden administration since the start of 2021 to undo much of the last four years.
中国非常务实地认识到，中美关系很难再恢复到原先状态。从2018-2019年的贸易战起，发生了太多事情，包括2020年的新冠疫情以及拜登政府自2021年初以来逆转不少过去四年的做法但对华政策导向却日益强硬。
but that does not mean that there isn't a pragmatic interest in preventing the relationship from becoming even worse, thereby compounding china's current levels of economic exposure.
但这并不意味着中国没有务实需要防止这种关系变得更糟进而防止进一步恶化中国面临的经济压力。
a framework of “managed strategic competition” that was able to “manage down” the growing array of security and foreign policy tensions that currently dominate the relationship with the united states, would enable beijing to focus once again on its longlist of continuing structural economic vulnerabilities.
一个“可管控的战略竞争”框架如果能够“管控”目前与美国在安全、外交政策等领域日益紧张的状态，这种紧张状态正主导中美关系，就可以使北京再次聚焦其现存的一系列结构性经济脆弱性。
indeed, it could be argued that if managed strategic competition was able to reduce overall security policy tensions for the decade ahead, it would be less problematic for china to extend its foreign policy influence – particularly if other countries no longer felt an acute, binary decision in their overall relationships with washington and beijing on fundamental national security grounds.
可以说，如果可管控的战略竞争能够缓解未来十年间安全政策领域的对抗程度，也将会减少中国扩大其外交政策影响力的阻力。尤其当其他国家不再需要为了维护国家根本安全而必须在华盛顿和北京之间作出非此即彼的艰难抉择时，这一阻力会大大减小。
in fact, if chinese foreign policy returned to being the handmaiden of its successful economic policy that we have seen over the last several decades, then china's net political position in the eyes of the world would probably be enhanced.
事实上，如果中国的外交政策重新服务于其成功的经济政策，正如我们在过去几十年中所见到的那样，其政治地位将在世界范围内进一步提升。
this would not preclude china, if it so chose, from continuing to wage its ongoing ideological contest against the u.s., the west, and the rest of the democratic world by defending and championing its own “china developmental model” in opposition to the “washington consensus” model.
这并不会排除中国，选择继续坚持维护和捍卫自己的“中国模式”并在意识形态领域与美国及西方等民主世界所奉行的“华盛顿共识”相竞争。
if china is convinced of the superiority of its own system – that, as president xi recently said, china has “pioneered a new and uniquely chinese path to modernization, and created a new model for human advancement,” and that this is “attributable to the fact that marxism works” – then it should be encouraged to do so.
如果中国确信自己的制度具有优越性 —— 正如中国领导人最近所说的那样，中国“创造了中国式现代化新道路，创造了人类文明新形态”，而这“归根到底是因为马克思主义行”——那么我们应该鼓励中国这么确信。
ideological and ideational competition in many respects would inevitably lie at the heart of a “managed strategic competition” framework. it is only natural that both sides should have self-confidence (自信) that their model is up to the task.
意识形态和观念的竞争在许多方面将不可避免地成为“可管控的战略竞争”框架的核心。自然双方都应该对自己的模式能够在竞争中胜出抱有自信。
as i have argued elsewhere, in the world of ideas, systems, and governance: may the best sidewin. but a “managed strategic competition” framework would also provide important scope for continued chinese cooperation with the united states indefined and agreed areas.
正如我曾经所说的那样，在思想、体制和治理等方面, 最优者胜。然而，“可管控的战略竞争”框架也将为中国与美国在双方同意的一定领域继续合作提供重大空间
there are a number of policy domains where china, for the decade ahead, would see its own national interests served by working collaboratively with the united states.
未来十年，中国会认为在许多政策领域上与美国合作符合自己的国家利益。
this includes the maintenance of global financial stability through the g20, the financial stability board, the basel committee, and the international monetary fund, where both china and the u.s. are already active members. china has no interest in a repeat of recent international financial crises as these could potentially derail china's long-term economic trajectory.
这包括通过g20 、金融稳定委员会、巴塞尔银行监理委员会和国际货币基金组织来维护全球金融稳定。中美双方都是上述组织的活跃成员国。中国绝不想之前的国际金融危机卷土重来，因为这可能会让中国脱离经济长期上升轨道。
second, on climate change, china's own national economic and environmental interests mandate global collaboration.
第二，气候变化层面。中国自身的经济和环境利益亟需全球共同合作。
although china is the largest global emitter of greenhouse gases and its national emission reduction targets are critical to global climate outcomes, they will ultimately be ineffective unless this is done in tandem with the u.s., europe, japan, and india.
尽管中国是全球最大的温室气体排放国，其减排目标对全球气候成果至关重要，但是除非与美国、欧洲、日本和印度共同完成减排任务，否则这些减排都将无法解决气候问题。
in other words, on climate there is no other option for beijing other than to work with washington to drive global outcomes.
换句话说，在气候问题上，北京除了与华盛顿合作推动全球气候治理别无选择。
third, there are the ongoing risks of global nuclear proliferation. iran and north korea represent the greatest dangers on this account.
第三，全球核扩散风险持续存在。在这方面，伊朗和朝鲜是当前的最大威胁。
while neither country is ever likely to target china, beijing does have an interest in preventing “retaliatory” proliferation by other states (for example japan) seeking to maintain their own security against future nuclear threats from tehran and pyongyang.
虽然这两个国家都不太可能视中国为敌，但防止其他国家（例如日本）以应对未来德黑兰和平壤的核威胁、维护自身安全为由进行“报复性”核武开发，仍然符合北京利益。
once again, there is a chinese national interest at stake in collaborating with the united states in maintaining the integrity of the existing multilateral non-proliferation regime.
与美国合作以维护现有的多边不扩散体制，攸关中国国家利益。
for all these reasons, “managed strategic competition” may offer china an alternative strategic framework to govern its overall relationship with the united states for the decade ahead.
因此，在未来的十年中，“可管控的战略竞争”也许可以为中国提供一个用以处理与美国关系的替代战略框架。
both china and the united states are currently in search of a new organizing principle for the relationship given the post-2017 u.s. strategic reality it now confronts.
基于2017年后的战略现实，中美两国目前都在为两国关系寻找新的管理原则。
there is no possibility of returning to a simpler era of what successive american administrations called “strategic engagement”. there has already been too much water under the bridge for that.
但是，想要回到美国历届政府称之为“战略接触”的那个时代，已经不可能了。其早已如流水逝去，不可挽回。
the critical question for beijing is whether there is sufficient leeway to work with under a concept of “managed strategic competition” from the perspective of its own national interests, values, and strategy to justify the security policy constraints that such a framework could impose. i do not know the answer to that question. but it is worth asking.
北京所面临的关键问题是，在“可管控的战略竞争”这一概念下，它是否有足够的回旋余地确保其自身的国家利益、价值观和战略，从而证明这一框架所施加的安全政策约束是合理的。我并不知道这个问题的答案是什么，但这是个值得提出的问题。
the underpinning logic of this concept of “managed strategic competition” may appear to some to be contradictory, in that such a mutually agreed framework provides both china and the united states with an opportunity to advance their respective regional and global objectives. but that is the essential point.
“可管控的战略竞争”这一概念的支撑逻辑在某些人看来也许是矛盾的，因为这样一个共同商定的框架同时为中美双方提供推进各自区域和全球目标的机会。但关键就在这儿。
for any such framework to be effective in reducing the risk of armed conflict in the midst of high-octane competition between the two countries, it must have some chance of being accepted, or at least recognized, in both capitals.
任何可以降低两国在激烈竞争中发生武装冲突风险的有效框架，都需要有一定机会被两国共同接受或至少承认。
otherwise, it would be little more than the sound of one hand clapping and of limited strategic use in stabilizing the relationship. therefore, to achieve its central purpose, managed strategic competition must offer a balanced framework. it cannot be loaded entirely in one direction or the other.
否则，它只能提供一些有限的稳定双边关系的战略用途。毕竟，一个巴掌拍不响。因此，为了实现其核心目标，可管控的战略竞争必须提供一个平衡的框架，不能完全倒向一方而忽略另一方。
were that to be the case, there would be no chance of it ever being adopted, or acknowledged, as a common approach. it would then simply be yet another unilateral formula with very few, if any, common rules of the road remaining.
如果是那样的话，就不可能被双方承认与接受为共同路径，而只是另一个几乎不能提供共同规则的单边方案。
as for the particular joint framework offered here, chinese critics will argue that it is too weighted in favor of american interests, most particularly on one of its critical assumptions concerning the desirability of maintaining the status quo over the taiwan situation.
至于这里提出的特定联合框架，中国评论家会说，它过于偏重美国利益，尤其是其建立在维持台湾局势现状的关键假设上。
this is an athema to fundamental chinese articles of faith. but the strategic reality is that to do anything other than to maintain stability over taiwan would automatically trigger equally fundamental american objections.
这是对中国基本信条的极端背离。但是，现在的战略现实是，除了维护台湾稳定的问题，其他任何事情都会自动引起美国的反对。
on the other hand, a number of american critics will attack the proposed formula as naive because it assumes that china would automatically adhere to the rules once they are agreed, when the same american critics argue that china can no longer be trusted.
另一方面，一些美国的评论家会抨击这个方案过于幼稚，因为这个方案假定只要与中国达成一致，其就会自动遵守规则。但这些人认为不能再相信中国。
however, the equal strategic reality here is that there is little that has been recommended under this framework that cannot readily be subject to monitoring and verification. trust, therefore, is not a prerequisite.
然而，战略现实是，在这一框架下几乎不会提出任何不受监督和核查的建议。因此，信任并不是先决条件。
the critical logic of managed strategic competition is to allow maximum competition across the full breadth of the foreign policy, economic, and security relationship, while doing this within fixed political guardrails that minimize the risk of crisis, conflict, and war.
“可管控的战略竞争”的关键是允许各国在确定的政治护栏内，在外交政策、经济和安全关系等全部领域进行最大程度的竞争。这些护栏可以最大限度地减少危机、冲突和战争爆发的风险。
therefore, for the terms of such a framework to be mutually acceptable and enforceable, each side would need to have some level of confidence that they could still effectively compete within it.
因此，为了使这样一个框架可以被接受并被执行，每一方都需要有一定程度的信心，认同他们可以在框架中进行有效的竞争。
of course, their individual capacities to advance their interests through such competition, and within the agreed parameters of managed strategic competition, would depend entirely on the effectiveness of their policies: a combination of economic success, political resilience, diplomatic skill, technological advancement as well as the robustness and global appeal of the competing ideational frameworks each side puts forward.
当然，在“可管控的战略竞争”的共同标尺下，双方通过这种竞争来促进自身利益的能力将完全取决于其政策的有效性，比如经济成功、政治弹性、外交技巧、技术进步以及双方提出的相互竞争的观念框架的稳健性和全球吸引力。
this approach is far from perfect, but for those who disagree with it, i offer this challenge: that the responsibility lies with the critics to come up with a more credible alternative.
“可管控的战略竞争”绝非完美，但对于那些不同意它的人，我诚挚邀请其提出更好的替代方案。
the reality is that in this new age of strategic competition between china and the united states, as a matter of logic, there are only two alternatives: managed competition, with some rules of the road and some prospect of preserving the peace; or unmanaged competition, the loss of all strategic guardrails, and the growing risk of crisis, conflict, or war.
现实是，在中美战略竞争新时代，从逻辑上说只有两种选择。要么管控竞争，用一些规则来维护和平；要么不受管控地竞争，没有任何战略护栏，从而面临日益增长的危机、冲突或战争的风险。
some nationalists on both sides might argue that all this does is kick the can down the road. there is truth in this. but that does not make it wrong to do. i would argue that there is nothing wrong, let alone cowardly, with kicking this particular can a long way down the road.
两国的民族主义者可能会争辩说，所有这一切就像是缓兵之计。虽然这有一定道理，但并不意味着这样做是错误的。我认为把棘手的问题束之高阁并无不妥，更谈不上是怯懦。
what managed strategic competition would do, in the end, is leave open another possibility: that, over time, if such a framework delivers the strategic stability that is being sought, new levels of trust may emerge in the longer term – even amid competition. and, in time, it may well come to pass that new ways of thinking (思维) about each other develop between china and america, and their peoples.
“可管控的战略竞争”最终提供了另一种可能性：随着时间的推移，即使依旧处于竞争中，这样的框架可能帮助我们找到一直寻求的战略稳定性，那么从长远角度来看，信任可能会被建立起来。而且，随着时间的推移，中美两国以及两国人民很可能形成相互之间的新思维。
common global challenges, like climate change, and pandemics, may assume a greater importance for all governments, as generations change and more classical forms of interstate rivalry begin to subside within our overall political priorities.
随着代际变化和国家间的传统竞争不再成为政治清单中的首要问题，气候变化、流行病等常见的全球性问题对于所有政府而言可能愈发变得意义重大了。
but for that to happen, we must first get through the current generation.
但是，要做到这一点，我们就必须挺过这一代的挑战。
when it comes to reassessing the international order in today's new era, finding a new strategic framework for the u.s.-china relationship is the place where we must begin.
当我们重新审视当今新时代的国际秩序时，为中美关系寻找新的战略框架是必要起点。（发言稿由嘉宾本人提供，翻译：束美锜）
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