讲座预告（12.6-尊龙体育官网

主讲人：

宋丙涛（河南大学经济学院教授、院长）

时间：

2022年12月6日（周二）

18：40-21：30

形式：

腾讯会议

会议号：357-547-706

主持人：

张越（北京大学经济学院经济史学系副研究员）

评论人：

周建波（北京大学经济学院经济史学系主任、教授）

席天扬（北京大学国家发展研究院长聘副教授）

主讲人简介：

宋丙涛，河南大学乡村振兴研究院院长，中国统计学会常务理事、河南省财政学会副会长。2011-12年、2013-14年曾两次当选中国留美经济学会副会长。长期从事英国产业革命与经济发展理论研究，近年来开始从事东西方文明比较方面的研究，尝试用公共经济理论来解释国家治理体系的内涵及背后的公共经济逻辑。先后在《中国社会科学（英）》、《经济研究》等学术期刊发表学术论文数十篇，在商务印书馆出版译著《自由与增长》、在社科文献出版社出版专著《英国崛起之谜》、《4000年黄河文明：国家治理的集体逻辑》。目前正在从事国家社科基金重点项目《国家治理能力与绩效的测度指标体系研究》与国家社科重大项目《乡村振兴的治理内涵与绩效测度研究》的研究工作。专著《英国崛起之谜》、论文《文明测度、治理绩效与公共经济的共享特征》先后获财政部、中国财政学会第六届、第七届全国财政理论优秀成果一等奖。

主办单位：

北京大学经济学院经济史学系

北京大学社会经济史研究所

北京大学外国经济学说研究中心

“经院-全健院”

 健康与劳动经济学工作坊 

主讲人：

meghan esson (university of iowa)

主持老师：

庄晨（北京大学经济学院助理教授）

参与老师：

（北大经院）秦雪征、石菊、姚奕、王耀璟、kevin devereux、梁远宁

（北大全健院）刘国恩、孙宇、潘聿航、吕蓓妮、林昊翔

时间：

2022年12月7日（周三）

10:00-11:30

形式：

zoom会议

会议号：874 8210 3239

摘要：

we identify, and quantify, a new form of welfare loss in insurance markets. we show that moral hazard from means-tested, out-of-pocket subsidies combined with community rating mimics adverse selection and can unravel insurance markets. we show that this is occurring on the aca exchanges, where out-of-pocket subsidies to low-income consumers lead to higher costs to insurers through moral hazard. using exogenous variation in the number of highly subsidized enrollees, we show that this moral hazard cost has led to higher premiums, which has lowered enrollment among the unsubsidized by 4%. we estimate the welfare costs of this “moral hazard induced unraveling” to be 5% of premiums, $123 per person, and similar in size to adverse selection.

主讲人简介：

meghan esson is an assistant professor in the department of finance at the university of iowa. she has a ph.d. in economics from the university of georgia.

 国际经济学与实证产业组织工作坊 

主讲人：

李蕾（德国曼海姆大学经济系助理教授）

主持老师：

（北大经院）莫家伟

参与老师：

（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文、吴群锋

（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽

时间：

2022年12月7日（周三）

16：00-17：30

形式：

zoom会议

会议号：985 8196 4971

摘要：

how does export affect firm location choice and spatial concentration? we address this question using the geo-coordinates of chinese manufacturing firms and find that export widens inter-city and intra-city spatial disparities. we first show that there has been an increased spatial concentration across cities in response to improved foreign market access. for a given industry, cities that were initially larger had higher employment intensity following improved foreign market access. second, there has also been an increased spatial concentration within cities. for a given industry, districts closer to city centers are getting denser, mainly driven by the extensive margin. third, the above effects are not exclusive to industries directly exposed to export shocks but also spill over positively to upstream and downstream industries and negatively to industries competing for the same workers locally.

主讲人简介：

李蕾，德国曼海姆大学经济系助理教授，德国劳动经济研究所（iza）青年会员。研究方向为国际贸易与劳动经济学，重点关注全球化对收入分配、人口流动和人力资本积累的影响，以及关税的价格传递效应。本科毕业于北航经管学院金融系，博士毕业于清华经管学院经济系，曾在瑞士苏黎世大学经济系从事博士后研究工作。

 风险、保险与不确定性经济学工作坊 

主讲人：

prof. dr. andreas richter（chair professor at lmu）

主持老师：

（北大经院）贾若、（人大财金）陈泽、（清华经管）刁莉

参与老师：

（北大经院）郑伟、（人大财金）魏丽、（清华经管）陈秉正 等

时间：

2022年12月7日（周三）

15：30-17：00

形式：

zoom会议

会议号：955 9708 1969  

密码：pw 611508

主讲人简介：

prof. dr. andreas richter is chair in risk and insurance, head of the institute for risk management and insurance, and chairman of munich risk and insurance center. his research interests include microeconomic theory of insurance, law and economics, and management of catastrophic risk. he has published papers in the journal of risk and insurance, journal of health economics, among others.

 发展与公共财政工作坊 

主讲人：

秦雨（新加坡国立大学商学院助理教授）

主持老师：

（北大国发院）席天扬、李力行

（北大经院）刘冲

时间：

2022年12月7日（周三）

13:30-15:00

形式：

zoom会议

会议号：818 4569 4814

密码：503967

摘要：

in this study we investigate disguised pollution by industrial firms in china. we find that sulfur dioxide (so2) readings increase by 10.8% in monitoring stations after sunset in high factory density areas, controlling for station-year and city-hour fixed effects. physical inspections by the ministry of environmental protection can only temporarily reduce disguised pollution, suggesting that reliance on physical inspections to enforce regulations is ineffective if firms can shift increased production activities to non-daylight hours. we show that direct monitoring, as is done with some large polluters in china, can prevent this and should be cost-effective to extend to all industrial polluters.

主讲人简介：

秦雨，新加坡国立大学商学院助理教授，她的研究兴趣包括与交通和房地产市场相关的城市经济学，以及与空气污染和气候变化相关的环境经济学。她的研究发表包括nature climate change, journal of public economics, journal of environmental economics and management, real estate economics等。目前，她是china economic review的联合编辑，journal of economic behavior & organization的副主编，journal of economic geography的编委会成员。

 微观理论经济学工作坊 

主讲人：

xiangyu shi (economics phd candidate, yale univerisity)

主持老师：

（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇

（北大国发院）胡岠

参与老师：

（北大经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇

（北大国发院）汪浩、胡岠

（北大光华）翁翕

时间：

2022年12月8日（周四）

10:30-12:00

形式：

zoom会议

会议号：863 7013 0403

会议密码：611730

摘要：

essay 1 title: relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks.

essay 1 abstract: in this paper, i study a principal-multiagent model where the principal adopts the relative performance evaluation (rpe) as the compensation strategy, and where agents are connected in an information network. the ability of each agent is private information, but adjacent agents in the information network can observe each other's ability. given rpe as the compensation scheme, and assuming that each agent is identical, the effect of adding links among agents on the effort level is ambiguous, and determined by the second- (complementarity) and third-order ("risk" attitude) cross-partial derivatives of the reward function. complete information networks may not be optimal for maximizing the performance of the organization. on the contrary, empty networks can be optimal in some cases.

essay 2 title: helping behavior in networked organizations.

essay 2 abstract: this article studies a networked organization in which agents work to directly increase the team's output and help neighbors to reduce the disutility of working. i establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of a two-stage game in which agents first decide how much helping effort to give to each neighbor, and, then, how much effort to expend to directly benefit the team. i show that dense networks might not necessarily sustain a higher level of help, because links might be redundant. if the agents are homogeneous, the network in which they are pairwise connected is the most efficient.

主讲人简介：

xiangyu shi is an economics phd candidate at yale univerisity. his research interests are social and economic networks and firm dynamics. his papers have been published at journal of development economics, and many of his papers are currently under review at leading economic journals. he serves as the referee for aer: insights, jleo, cer, and among others.