编者按：美国学者迈克尔•伯克利和霍•布兰德斯在《外交》《外交政策》连续刊文揣测“中国崛起已终结”、“中国正在衰弱”。对此，中国人民大学重阳金融研究院执行院长王文近日连续在英国网媒《all china review》头条刊发两篇长文《为什么中国崛起将持续》、《中美两国到底该竞争什么》，引起不少关注。现将中、英文版推荐如下：
两篇文章在《all china review》上的版面截图
当美国学者认为“中国崛起已终结”、“中国正在衰弱”时，中国学者会心一笑，把这种观点视为不了解中国的美国式嫉妒，不值得一驳。这正是为什么迈克尔•伯克利（michael beckley）和霍•布兰德斯（hal brands）两位教授连续在《外交》《外交政策》发表了这个主题的长文，在中国没有任何一位学者驳斥的重要原因。过去20多年，美国学术界对中国的一些歪曲言论，比如章家敦与沈大伟的“中国崩溃论”，中国学者会奋而反击。这一次，中国思想界显然淡定、自信很多。
不过，我不希望美国知识精英持有这种看法。预估中国衰弱，与预测中国崩溃，都有相似的风险：背离中国常识，进而战略性地误判中国。任何学理分析，都不应违背常识。中国崛起已不可逆。中国崛起并非无助于美国利益，也并不可怕。相反，忽视这一点，妖魔化中国崛起，才是令人担心的。
中国持续崛起的基本常识
改革开放40多年来形成的中国发展惯性，使预测中国变得不再那么困难。许多懂得投资中国的战略家们，通常会在五年规划、党代会报告、政府工作报告里寻觅中国下一步的演变轨迹。即使那些怀疑共产党文件的人，恐怕也不能回避以下三个支撑中国持续崛起的基本常识。
第一个的基本常识是，所有中国人都想谋求更好的生活。这是推动中国持续崛起的原动力。相比毛泽东年代，当下的中国人已不愿意为革命理想而忍受贫穷。追求更好的物质待遇与精神享受，成为1978年邓小平时代以来最大的中国国家梦想，也是最广泛的国民共识。习近平2012年上任第一天就宣称，人民对美好生活的向往就是中国共产党的奋斗目标。
比起1978年时中国仍是全世界最贫穷的国家之一，现在的中国已稳居世界第二大经济体，但不要忘了，中国城镇人均住房面积仅39平方米，虽是1978年8.1平方米的5倍，但仍不足美国人（约65平米）的2/3。中国人均拥有小汽车仅有0.21辆，仅为美国人的1/5。中国城镇化率仅仅57%，比起美国82%城镇化率相差甚远。中国人均年社会消费品金额约4600美元，仅是美国人的1/4。
有些数据更令人惊讶。截至2020年，中国约600个机场，美国却拥有13500多个。在中国，仍有10亿中国人没有坐过飞机。2亿中国人家庭里还没有马桶，只能用蹲式的厕所。中国人获得大学教育的比例仅有4%，而美国却有25%左右。
21世纪前20年，中国新产生了2亿中产阶级。世界透过深圳、上海浦东的高楼大厦看到中国繁荣，但不要忘记深圳与浦东20年前还是贫困之地，而现在中国许多地方正如20年前的深圳、浦东那样。
常识告诉我们，只要勤奋的中国人想吃得更好、住得更好、穿得更好，并确保这些个人梦想逐渐实现，中国在2035年就会再出现2亿中产阶级。全球第二大经济体的体量，不可能是中国发展的上限。
有人会质疑中国是否能够推出持续确保增长的政策。这正是第二个美国人很难理解的基本常识：中国政策的延续性。
邓小平时期确立的改革开放政策，在江泽民、胡锦涛两任领导人期间延续得很好，习近平同样在坚持，不同的只是随着时代背景的变化出现了一些基于现实挑战的调整。比如，一胎计划生育政策坚持了30多年，随着老龄化的出现，习近平时期将其改为二胎、三胎政策。解决8亿人的绝对贫困难题基础上，中国再推进乡村振兴计划。在确立科技是第一生产力的政策之后，面临着美国的技术封堵，中国推行科技自主的强国政策。在出现房地产泡沫后，中国推行“房住不炒”政策及试点房产税，确保过去五年中国房价基本不涨。在保证了金融稳定的同时，逐渐推进金融开放，进而使中国在2020年第一次成为全球最大的外资流入国。
这些根据实际情况推进的改革与循序渐进的开放，正是邓小平时代就确立的国策。中国领导人不断自我警醒，要有防止失去江山的危机感。平均每隔两个月，作为最高决策层的中共中央政治局（共25人）就会集体学习。2021年集体学习包括数字经济、区块链、生物安全等8个主题。每次集体学习，习近平都会强调满足人民需求的重要性。所有中国人都知道，奔向2035年、2050年的中国路径就是为了满足民众需要。当然，这条路很曲折、泥泞、凹凸不平，但方向是确定的。
外部力量是否能阻止中国人追求美好生活，中断中国政策的延续性？没有任何外部力量敢入侵中国，这是第三个基本常识。
1979年霍梅尼革命后的伊朗崛起，被两伊战争中断。1979年入侵阿富汗，是苏联衰弱的开始。2002年阿富汗战争，是美国霸权坠落的节点。中国是过去40年唯一没有卷入或发动战争的主要经济体，正如同20世纪上半叶美国远离一战、二战那样获得了增长的和平红利。中国大力发展航母、核潜艇、洲际导弹，却又不像美国那样在海外设立数百个军事基地，精准地保持不对外发动战争与防止外敌入侵之间的平衡点。
目前看来，若台湾宣布独立，中国大陆将动用武力，并不惜与任何协防台湾的外部力量为敌，是当下最大的战争风险点。这考验着中国人的智慧，同样考验着全世界尤其是美国人防范风险的智慧与理性。
基于这些基本常识，中国崛起终结的概率是相当低的。预设中国衰弱，为时过早。
中美竞争，应该为了什么
人类文明进入到21世纪。中美两国到底需要怎样的竞争，才能真正体现出大国竞争的文明性、进步性？
在我看来，中美首先应为解决全球发展困境的竞争。美国曾被视为“灯塔之国”，为二战以后各国的经济复苏、金融稳定、社会发展、科技创新做出不可灭的贡献。但正如罗斯福当年所担心的，21世纪以来的美国并没有带动全世界的国民健康、创建新企业、就业机会持续提升。在许多中国人眼里，美国神话的坠落始于2008年金融危机，特朗普执政四年尤其是新冠疫情防控失败更是全面冲击了美国长期以来营造的“国设”。皮尤研究中心2020年9月全球调查结果显示，由于美国政府疫情应对的不力表现，美国国家形象和时任美国总统特朗普的个人形象从差劲跌至糟糕透顶。只有16%的人相信特朗普会“在世界事务中做正确的事”。
相比之下，2008年北京奥运圆满举办，令中国国家声望呈加速度崛起之势。此后，高铁建设、电子商务、无现实支付、消除贫困、打击腐败、污染防治等极大推动了中国发展模式在发展中国家的吸引力，也使中国道路成为摆脱全球发展困境的另一个尊龙体育官网的解决方案选项。正如1970年代民主化第三波浪潮中，数十个国家以美国为榜样、推动本国的政治转型那样，2020年代的非洲、亚洲亦出现了学习中国经验的萌芽。在许多国家看来，过去半个世纪的民主化转型，彻底改变命运的国家仍是少数，多数穷国仍是穷国的客观现实，而中国却从穷转富的逆袭之路，使得中国显现足以与美国模式吸引力相匹配的竞争力。
2021年美国领衔g7推出b3w（build back better world）战略，试图支持发展中国家的基础设施建设，暴露了美国对中国“一带一路”倡议有效性的首次承认，也体现了美国被迫对中国模式竞争力的理性回应。中美两国为解决全球发展困境的竞争，本质在于哪个国家更能为世界发展提供有效的尊龙体育官网的解决方案，更在于哪个国家能治理好本国生活便利、民众福祉、社会稳定与经济复苏。
第二、中美应为应对全球气候变化的竞争。气候变化已经到了紧急的危机时刻。越来越多的气候科学家认为，如果任由地球气候继续升高而不采取实质且有效的措施，不排除21世纪是最后一个人类文明的完整世纪。气候危机还会伴随着金融危机、能源危机甚至数倍于新冠疫情危机的社会危机。
2020年底，已有约130个国家宣示未来20-40年实现碳中和，包括美国2050年实现碳中和，中国2060年实现碳中和。然而，全世界明显低估了两国合作应对气候变化的顺畅度。中美两国占全球二氧化碳排放量的45%左右，能为世界提供约60%以上的资金，一旦两国在地缘政治、经贸摩擦、区域安全等领域继续保持紧张的状态，势必会导致两国共同应对气候变化的合力受到重创。这充分考验拜登试图将合作、竞争、对抗分类管理的对华政策，也考验两国为人类未来而合作的大局意识。
中美两国应当在气候变化领域赋能世界展开竞争，这包括但不限于为非洲提供气候遥感卫星，为东南亚建低碳示范区，为南太平洋小岛国提供节能灯，为世界提供更多绿色基建、绿色能源、绿色交通、绿色技术而提供信贷与资金。让全球气候变化合作更实、更久而展开的中美竞赛，就像富豪公益排行榜，是世界所期待的。
还有，中美应为推动全球技术革新的竞争。智能科技犹如打开了“潘多拉魔盒”，人类在人工智能技术面前是变得更强，还是变得更弱？是走向新的繁荣，还是走向灭亡？这些都将是一个终极的思考。
1944年11月17日，罗斯福总统向范内瓦•布什博士问询了未来和平时期科学的作用。其中有一句话非常感人：“我们的面前是各类思想的新前沿，如果我们以应对这场战争所用的同样眼光、勇气和干劲去开拓，我们就能创造更为充分更加丰富的就业机会和生活。”8个月后，范内瓦用一份题为《科学：无尽的前沿》的报告回复总统问询。该报告后来成为推动二战后美国科技事业发展的伟大文件。75年后，这份报告中文版问世，数百位中国科学家、it业企业家对之赞誉，并讨论中国该从中借鉴什么。这场关于“无尽前沿”的竞争已在中美两国拉开。
不过，对于像我这样的中国社会科学学者而言，中美两国对“无尽前沿的竞争”的范畴恐怕要比范内瓦时代更宽泛、更复杂。这场竞争美国不一定输，中国也没有注定赢。更确切地讲，只要一国输，另一方也不会赢，正如这场新冠疫情一样，只要病毒还没有得到控制，就不能说谁赢得了这场抗击疫情的战争。
2021年是中美关系史上具有标志性的一年。美国结束了21世纪以来对中国战略定位的摇摆状态，正式将中国视为“首要竞争对手”，希望继续保持美国霸权。“竞争”的这个词，中国决策者并不排斥，但与美国决策者理解得不一样。2018年中国外交部长王毅曾坦言：“如果说中美之间有竞争的话，那也应该是良性和积极的竞争”。2021年1月，中国国家主席习近平在达沃斯论坛的视频讲话中暗示中美两国竞争的预期：“提倡公平公正基础上的竞争，开展你追我赶、共同提高的田径赛，而不是搞相互攻击、你死我活的角斗赛。”
如果两国必须竞争的话，我希望不是拳击赛，而是打高尔夫。谁赢，都意味着世界更高的文明与发展。从这个角度看，真正考验两国竞争文明的时刻刚刚开始。在这个新起点，认为中国崛起终结的说法，显然是太短视了。
以下为两篇文章英文版
what should the competition between china and the us be for
by wang wen
（wang wen is executive dean and professor of chongyang institute for financial studies, renmin university of china, and a senior fellow in the counselor's office of the state council of china.）
human civilization is approaching the close of the first quarter of the 21st century with eyes toward 2050.what kind of competition do china and the united states need to truly fathom if they are are to advance global civilization in their great power competition?
in my opinion, china and the united states should first compete to solve the dilemma of global development. the united states was once regarded as a "lighthouse state", making significant contributions to economic recovery, financial stability, social development and scientific and technological innovation of various countries after world war ii. but just as president franklin delano roosevelt worried, the united states in the 21st century has failed to promote national health, the creation of new enterprises, and the continuous improvement of employment opportunities in the world. in the eyes of many chinese people, the fall of the american myth began with the financial crisis in 2008.the four years of trump's presidency, especially the failure of covid-19 prevention and control, have dealt a full blow to the long-established "national identity" of the united states. according to the september 2020 pew research center global survey, the us national image and then-president donald trump's image fell from poor to abysmal. this was directly due to the us government's poor response to the pandemic. only 16% believed trump would, “do the right thing in world affairs.”
by contrast, the successful hosting of the 2008 beijing olympic games accelerated the rise of china's national reputation. since then, high-speed rail construction, e-commerce, e-payments, poverty eradication, corruption and pollution prevention and control have greatly boosted the attractiveness of china's development model to developing countries. this has made china's path an alternative solution to the global development dilemma. just as in the third wave of democratization in the 1970s, dozens of countries took the united states as an example to promote their political transformation. in the 2020s, africa and asia also witnessed the germination of learning from china's hard won experience. in the eyes of many countries, the democratic transformation of the past half-century has completely changed the fate of a small number of countries. yet the majority of poor countries are still poor. however, china's counter-attack road from poverty to wealth makes china appear competitive enough to the u.s. model.
in 2021, the us led the g7 in launching the b3w (build back better world) strategy to support infrastructure construction in developing countries. this exposed the us’s first recognition of the effectiveness of china's belt and road initiative. it reflected the rational response the us was forced to make to the competitiveness of china's model. the essence of the competition between china and the united states to solve the global development dilemma lies in this question: which country can offer more effective solutions to world development? more importantly, which country can best manage the convenience of life, the well-being of its people, social stability, and economic recovery?
second, china and the united states should compete to deal with global climate change. climate change has reached a critical moment. more and more climate scientists believe that if the earth's climate continues to rise without taking substantive and effective measures, the 21st century could be the last complete century of human civilization. many do not rule this out. the climate crisis will also be accompanied by other sharp crises: energy, financial, and social. these will be of much greater magnitude than the suffering caused from the covid-19 pandemic.
by the end of 2020, some 130 countries had pledged to be carbon neutral over the next 20-40 years. this included the us by 2050 and china by 2060.yet the world has obviously underestimated the smoothness of the cooperation between the two countries in addressing climate change, now referred to by many as “climate crisis”. china and the united states account for about 45% of global carbon dioxide emissions, and can provide more than 60% of the world's financial resources. if the two countries continue to maintain tensions over geopolitics, economics and trade, regional security, and other fields, their joint efforts to deal with climate change will be severely damaged. this will test biden's china policy. already, the biden administration has tried to categorize cooperation, competition, and confrontation, (as well as the overall sense of cooperation between the two countries) for the future of humanity.
on this matter, i spoke with china's climate envoy xie zhenhua. china very much welcomes the biden administration to lead the united states back to the framework of climate governance. however, it is also concerned about the back-and-forth of u.s. climate policy in the post-biden era. china and the united states should lead the world to compete in the field of climate change. this should include (but not be limited to) providing climate remote sensing satellites for africa, building low-carbon demonstration zones for southeast asia, and installing energy-saving lamps for small island countries in the south pacific. the two need to provide credit and funds for more green infrastructure, energy, transportation and technology for the world. the world expects the china-us competition to make global cooperation on climate change more practical and lasting.
moreover, china and the united states should compete to promote global technological innovation. developing intelligent technology is like opening "pandora's box". will human beings become stronger or weaker in the face of artificial intelligence technology? towards new prosperity, or extinction? these will be the ultimate tests of humanity’s thinking.
on november 17, 1944, president roosevelt asked dr. vannevar bush about the future role of science in peacetime. here's a moving line from that conversation: “before us are new frontiers of thought, and if we use them with the same vision and courage and drive that we used to fight this war, we can create jobs and lives that are fuller and richer.” eight months later, dr. bush responded to the president's inquiry with a report titled, "science: the endless frontier.” the report became the great document that drove the development of science and technology in the united states after world war ii. seventy-five years later, when the report was published in chinese, hundreds of chinese scientists and it entrepreneurs praised it and debated what china could learn from it. the race for the "endless frontier" is already underway in china and the us.
however, for chinese social science scholars like me, the scope of the “competition for endless frontiers” between china and the united states is probably broader and more complex than it was in the days of dr. bush. the united states is not necessarily losing this competition. nor is china destined to win it. more precisely, as long as one country loses, the other cannot win. just as with covid-19, as long as the virus is not under control, it is impossible to say who is winning the war against the pandemic. this is myopic thinking, and we truly both need to put our heads together to correct facts, and forge win-win initiatives.
we can deduce this much: 2021 is a landmark year in the history of china-us relations. the united states has ended its vacillation on china's strategic positioning since the 21st century commenced. it formally regards china as a "primary competitor” in a hope to maintain american hegemony. the word "competition" is not rejected by chinese policymakers. however, they do not understand it in the same way as american policymakers. in 2018, chinese foreign minister wang yi said, “if there is competition between china and the united states, it should also be a healthy and positive one.” in january 2021, chinese president xi jinping hinted at the prospect of competition between china and the united states in a video speech at davos. president xi said, “we should promote competitions based on fairness and justice, and carry out competitions that seek to catch up with each other and improve together, rather than engage in a fight that attacks each other.”
if the two countries have to compete, i hope it's not a boxing match. i hope it’s more like golf. whoever wins will need to support global civilization, and development of the world. from this point of view, the real test of the two countries' competitive civilization has just begun. at this new starting point, talking about the end of china’s rise is incredibly shortsighted—if not altogether blind.
why will china’s rise continue
by wang wen
recently, a few american scholars have blindly forecast, “the end of china's rise”, “china is a declining power.” when chinese scholars hear this, many smile wide, suppressing chuckles. to them, these erroneous end of china slogans only reveal knee-jerk jealousy, and nothing more.
after all, these blowhard oracles are only displaying their raw ignorance. they are not worth refuting. this is why chinese scholars have not spent a nickel’s worth of free advice to disabuse michael beckley and hal brands, who published long articles on these topics in foreign affairs and foreign policy. over the past 20 years, there have been a slew of distorted remarks concocted about china by american scholars, such as gordon g. chang and david shambaugh in the coming collapse of china. each time, they were vigorously countered by chinese scholars. this time, the chinese intellectual community is obviously remaining calm and confident.
however, i don't want american intellectuals to entertain these highly deceptive viewpoints. they should be brighter and far more sophisticated than this. especially if they are to postulate points for policymakers, businesses and the american public to negotiate properly with china. predicting china's decline carries similar risks as predicting its collapse. both deviate from china’s common sense with strategic misjudgments. any theoretical analysis should not go against common sense. china's rise is irreversible. china's rise is not unhelpful to american interests. nor is it frightening. instead, either ignoring or demonizing the rise of china is extremely worrying. it misses the ball entirely—and china is all about playing ball.
the inertia of china's development over the past four decades of reform and opening-up has made it less difficult to predict the country’s future development trends. many strategists who know how to invest in china usually look sinecure development tracks in the five-year plans, party congress reports, and government work reports. even those who doubt the communist party document cannot avoid the following three basic facts that underpin china's continued rise.
the first basic fact is this: all chinese people seek a better life. this is the driving force behind china's sustained rise. compared with mao's time, chinese people are no longer willing to endure poverty for revolutionary ideals. pursuing better material benefits and spiritual enjoyment has become the biggest national dream of china since deng's era in 1978.italso presently carries the broadest national consensus. on his first day in office in 2012, xi jinping declared that the people's desire for a better life is the goal of the communist party of china (cpc).
china is now firmly the world's second-largest economy, compared with 1978 when it was one of the poorest countries in the world. this growth is tangible everywhere across the country. for example, china's urban housing per capita is only 39 square meters, but this is five times that of the 8.1 square meters in 1978. this is still less than two-thirds that of americans (about 65 square meters). also, the average chinese owns just 0.21 cars per person, a fifth as many as americans. china's urbanization rate is only 57 percent, compared with 82 percent in the us. the average annual consumption of consumer goods in china is about $4,600, only a quarter of that in the united states.
other statistics are more illuminating. as of 2020, china had about 600 airports, while the united states had more than 13,500.in china, there are still 1 billion citizens who have never flown in the sky. and 200 million chinese still don't have western toilets in their homes, using basic squat toilets instead. only 4 percent of chinese have a college education, compared with about 25 percent in the united states.
however, in the first 20years of the 21st century, china created 200 million new middle class citizens. the world today witnesses with wide-eyes china’s prosperity through the high-rise buildings of shenzhen and shanghai, particularly pudong district. but it should not be forgotten that shenzhen and pudong were poor places 20years ago. in fact, many parts of china today are just like shenzhen and pudong 20-years ago. they will change too, soaring to the clouds. common sense tells us that as long as diligent chinese people want to eat better, live better, and dress better, this will ensure that their personal dreams are gradually realized. the translation? china will have another 200 million middle class residents by 2035. the volume of the world's second-largest economy cannot be the upper limit of china's development.
certain western naysayers need to think hard about this. some will question whether china can introduce policies to sustain this effervescent growth. this is the second basic fact that americans struggle to grasp: the continuity of chinese policy. the policy of reform and opening up established during deng xiaoping's reign continued well under jiang zemin and hu jintao, and thrives today under xi jinping. the difference is that some adjustments have been made based on realistic challenges as times changed dramatically. for example, the one-child policy was adhered to for more than 30 years. with the emergence of an aging population, the policy has been changed to a two-child and three-child policy under xi jinping. on the basis of lifting 800 million people out of absolute poverty, china is nurturing rural revitalization plans. after establishing policies that put science and technology as the primary productive forces, china is carrying out policies for independent power in science and technology. this is successfully being implemented despite facing the technological blockades from the united states.
in the wake of the real estate bubble, china has implemented the policy of "no speculation in housing”. it has also instituted a pilot property tax to ensure that prices remain stable over a period of five years. moreover, china became the world's largest recipient of foreign capital for the first time in 2020. it did so by gradually advancing financial opening-up measures while ensuring financial stability.
these reforms and gradual opening-up measures were skillfully set in motion in accordance with the actual conditions of state policies established during the deng xiaoping era. chinese leaders are constantly alert and self aware. they do not have a sense of crisis to prevent from losing their country. on average, every two months, the political bureau of the cpc central committee (25 people in total), as the highest decision-making level body, will collectively study the situational landscape. in 2021, collective learning included eight themes, covering the digital economy, blockchain, and biosafety. during each study session, xi stressed the importance of meeting the needs of the people. all chinese people know that the chinese path towards 2035 and 2050 must meet the needs of the people. sure, the path is twisty, muddy, and bumpy. but the direction is certain.
can external forces stop the pursuit of a better life and interrupt the continuity of chinese policy? no outside force dares to invade china. this is the third element of basic common sense.to put this into historical perspective, iran’s rise after the 1979 khomeini revolution was interrupted by the iran-iraq war. the invasion of afghanistan in 1979 was the beginning of the soviet union's last spasm and eventual decline. many contented that the afghan war in 2002 was the point at which american hegemony fell. in this same 40 year stretch, china was the only major economy not involved in a war. instead, china reaped the growing peace dividend, just as the united states did in the first half of the 20th century when it moved away from world war i and world war ii. china has meanwhile developed and invested in state of the art aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and intercontinental missiles. however, unlike the united states, which has hundreds of military bases overseas, china has kept a precise balance between not waging war and preventing foreign invasion.
at present, if the province of taiwan declares independence, the mainland will deploy military force. beijing will not hesitate to be an enemy of any external forces to help defend taiwan province, which is presently the biggest risk for sparking armed conflict in the region. this tests the wisdom of the chinese people. it also informs the wisdom and rationality of the whole world, especially americans, to mitigate and prevent risks. based on these basic facts, the probability of the end of china's rise is quite low. it is too early for anyone to predict china's decline.
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